ABSTRACT In 2009, Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ('President Bashir') 
I INTRODUCTION
If Bashir were to come to South Africa today, we will definitely implement what we are supposed to in order to bring the culprit to [The] Hague. … We can't allow a situation whereby an individual tramples on people's rights and gets away with it … The perpetrators of war crimes should be tried at all costs. remain open amongst some international legal scholars who argue that this would be breaching the personal immunity granted to heads of state under rules of customary international law. 13 However, in view of the Bashir case, by issuing the warrants of arrest the ICC found that President Bashir does not enjoy immunity from prosecution as it would be inconsistent with the purposes and framework of the ICC Statute; that President Bashir's official capacity as head of state provides no exemption from criminal responsibility and that there are no exceptions in this case; and that the UN Security Council removed any personal immunities by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
14 The Bashir case potentially represents a benchmark for international criminal justice to the extent that it enhances the legal pedigree providing for the prosecution of serving heads of state of non-parties to the ICC Statute. 15 This article argues that South Africa had clear legal obligations to arrest President Bashir. The article articulates these obligations, which begin with South Africa's duty to comply with the provisions of the ICC Statute. The existence of the charge of genocide against President Bashir further obligated South Africa to act. The legal obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide was initially set out in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 16 but has since emerged as a binding rule of customary international law and represents both erga omnes and jus cogens obligation.
17 South Africa's obligation to arrest President Bashir was reinforced by Sudan's and South Africa's UN membership. 18 As this article observes, there are potential consequences that flow from South Africa's failure to fulfil this duty. These include the ICC finding South Africa in breach of its obligations under the ICC Statute and resulting in a referral to the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC and even to the Security Council for possible action. In the meantime, on the ICC's website, the words 'at large' continue to be displayed next to the Bashir case somewhat uncomfortably. 19 By focusing on the South African example, this article provides a comprehensive assessment of some states' failure to act upon the ICC's arrest warrants for President Bashir. The article comprises six parts. Part I provides a general introduction. Part II overviews the Bashir case with the aim to provide context for the discussion in the following parts and simultaneously to demonstrate the seriousness of the 13 See discussion in pt V B-C below. crimes with which President Bashir is charged and the associated importance of his arrest. Part III looks at South Africa's response to the obligation to cooperate with the ICC and arrest President Bashir. This part surveys steps taken by both the South African Government and South African judiciary vis-à-vis President Bashir's visit to South Africa in June 2015, highlighting the divergence between the law and politics in the African milieu. Part IV outlines the law concerning head of state immunity. Part V considers pro et contra arguments relating to the specific June 2015 events in South Africa and observes the broader consequences created by those events. Part VI concludes that despite a legal basis for arrest of President Bashir, political nuances of the case curtailed President Bashir's arrest creating implications for future effectiveness of the ICC.
II THE BASHIR CASE A Understanding the Sudanese Situation
During the course of 2004, Western media began to increasingly raise awareness of the situation taking place in Sudan. Pronouncements were made about 'the worst humanitarian crisis in the world' 20 and more than one million people 'being affected by ethnic cleansing'. 21 In the United States, the then Secretary of State, Colin Powell, testified before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee where he stated that 'genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibility -and that genocide may still be occurring'. 22 On 18 September 2004, acting under ch VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution in which they requested that:
the Secretary-General rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable … and included numerous individual case studies. 24 In the Commission's view, these violations amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 25 The Darfur Commission Report did also make findings in relation to whether acts of genocide occurred. To this extent, the Darfur Commission concluded that the government of Sudan did not pursue a policy of genocide as the crucial element of 'genocidal intent' did not appear to be present. 26 However, the Darfur Commission Report did go on to qualify this decision in the following manner:
The Commission does recognize that in some instances, individuals, including Government officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent. Whether this was the case in Darfur, however, is a determination that only a competent court can make on a case-by-case basis. 27 Luban draws a direct corollary in the evidence between the situation in Darfur and the events that took place in Srebrenica, but highlights how the Darfur Commission and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ('ICTY') reach totally different legal conclusions. 28 Nevertheless, the Darfur Commission recommended that 'the Security Council … refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court', as many of the alleged crimes met 'all the thresholds' of the Court and Sudan had 'demonstrated its inability and unwillingness to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators'. 29 The Darfur Commission did not identify the alleged perpetrators specifically, but noted that they consisted of individuals that included 'officials of the Government of the Sudan'. 30 It was recommended that a sealed file with all of the names of the perpetrators be handed to the ICC.
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C President Bashir's Role
On 31 March 2005, acting under ch VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council did in fact, by Resolution 1593, refer the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the ICC. 32 The number of votes in favour of Resolution 1593 was 11, none against, with four abstentions.
33 One of the abstentions came from the US, although in explaining their position the US representative expressed support for bringing to justice those responsible for the crimes and noted that 'by adopting [the] resolution, the international community had established an accountability mechanism for the perpetrators of crimes and atrocities in Darfur'.
34
The ICC is able to exercise its jurisdiction over the alleged crimes pursuant to art 13(b) of its Statute, which provides for such jurisdiction in 'a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under ch VII of the Charter of the United Nations'.
35
The rationale of art 13(b) is to empower the ICC to prosecute crimes committed in the territory of a State Party non-party to the ICC Statute by individuals who are not nationals a State Party, 36 which is the case in the Sudan. This supplements the provisions of art 12(2) of the ICC Statute which provide that for matters referred to the ICC by a State Party or where the ICC prosecutor has initiated an investigation proprio motu, the ICC will only exercise its jurisdiction where the 'conduct in question occurred' in the territory of a State Party or the 'the person accused of the crime is a national' of a State Party.
37
Following an investigation by the ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that 'Omar Al Bashir is criminally responsible under article 25(3)(a) of the [ICC] Statute as an indirect perpetrator, or as an indirect co-perpetrator for those war crimes and crimes against humanity' found by the Chamber to have occurred in Darfur. 38 Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute provides that: a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible. 39 Accordingly, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that art 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute embraces 'four manifestations of the notion of control of the crime', including direct perpetration, indirect perpetration, co-perpetration and indirect co- 41 that this common plan included unlawful attacks on certain elements of the civilian population in Darfur;
42 that these unlawful attacks involved 'forcible transfers and acts of murder, extermination, rape, torture, and pillage';
43 that President Bashir and the other high ranking Sudanese officials 'directed the branches of the "apparatus" of the State of Sudan … in a coordinated manner, in order to jointly implement the common plan';
44 that the common plan was to a large extent implemented through local Security Committees, which necessarily included the Janjaweed; 45 and that Al Bashir as President of Sudan and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces played an essential role in 'coordinating the design and implementation of the common plan'. 46 In the alternative, Pre-Trial Chamber I also found reasonable grounds that President Bashir played a role that went beyond coordination, that he 'was in full control of all branches of the "apparatus" of the State' and that he 'used such control to secure the implementation of the common plan'.
47
Similar to the Darfur Commission's findings in respect to the crime of genocide, Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded that the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the Government of Sudan acted with the necessary specific genocidal intent was not the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn. Therefore, there was no recommendation for a warrant of arrest to be issued against President Bashir for the crime of genocide. 48 The warrant of arrest issued against President Bashir on 4 March 2009 was confined to the various crimes relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity. These included intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against civilians not taking direct part in hostilities and pillage as war crimes, and murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape as crimes against humanity. 49 Following an appeal by the Prosecutor of the ICC against the decision of PreTrial Chamber I, on 3 February 2010 the Appeals Chamber reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision 'to the extent that Pre-Trial Chamber I decided not to issue a warrant of arrest in respect of the crime of genocide'. 50 The reasoning behind the Appeals Chamber decision related to the evidentiary threshold necessary for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, which pursuant to art 58(1)(a) of the ICC Statute is 'reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime'. The Appeals Chamber distinguished this test with that of the threshold required to confirm charges, being 'substantial grounds to believe' and the threshold for a conviction, being 'beyond reasonable doubt'. 51 Both of these are higher evidentiary standards. In requiring the existence of genocidal intent as the only reasonable conclusion, the Appeals Chamber noted that Pre-Trial Chamber I placed a requirement on the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable conclusion, thereby having to eliminate any reasonable doubt. This was an 'erroneous standard' and one that 'was higher and more demanding than what is required under [art 58(1)(a)] of the Statute'.
52
On 12 July 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a second decision on the Prosecutor's application for a warrant of arrest against President Bashir, in line with the Appeals Chamber conclusion, which is binding. 53 A separate self-executing warrant of arrest was issued against President Bashir for the crime of genocide on the same day, which included genocide by killing, by causing serious bodily or mental harm and by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction. 54 The Darfur conflict remains the only application of the crime of genocide by the ICC and the only application of the crime of genocide by the ICC allegedly committed by an incumbent Head of State nonparty to the ICC Statute.
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III SOUTH AFRICA'S FAILURE TO ARREST PRESIDENT BASHIR
A Communications between the ICC and South Africa 
63
In response to this claim, the DRC Decision states that '[a]n exception to the personal immunities of Heads of States is explicitly provided in article 27(2) of the Statute for prosecution before an international criminal jurisdiction'.
64
Article 27(2) of the ICC Statute stipulates that '[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person'. As a result, 'the existence of personal immunities under international law which generally attach to the official capacity of the person "shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person"'.
65
(i) The Reach of Article 27
As Sudan is not a party to the ICC Statute, however, the DRC Decision then goes on to examine the reach of art 27 and whether it applies to heads of state of third parties. 
(iii) UN Security Council Resolution 1593
However, the DRC Decision claims that through Resolution 1593, 69 the Security Council has decided that the 'Government of Sudan … shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution'. 70 As such, the 'cooperation' required under art 98(1) was secured through Resolution 1593, as the Security Council had 'implicitly waived the immunities granted to Omar Al Bashir under international law and attached to his position as a Head of State'.
71
The DRC Decision concludes that, by securing Sudan's cooperation, no inconsistency existed in regards to the DRC and their obligation to carry out the arrest warrants issued for President Bashir and that 'the DRC cannot invoke any other decision, including that of the African Union, providing for any obligation to the contrary'. 72 The DRC Decision underlines that '[h]ad the Court found any legal impediment (procedural or substantive) to the execution of the pending requests for arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir, it would have explicitly ruled to that effect'. 
(b) Summary
On this basis it was communicated to the Ambassador of South Africa during the 12 June 2015 meeting that 'there is no ambiguity in the law', and since the Court's finding in the DRC Decision 'settled the very same matter', the international obligation vis-à-vis the arrest warrants for President Bashir 'applies squarely to the Republic of South Africa as well'.
74
In his decision on South Africa, Judge Tarfusser made it clear that 'the consultation between the Court and the Republic of South Africa under article 97 … do not trigger any suspension or stay of this standing obligation', and reiterated 'that the Republic of South Africa is under the obligation to immediately arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir as soon as on its territory'. 
77
On the same day, a request for an order further clarifying whether art 97 consultations with South Africa had concluded and that the Republic of South Africa was under the obligation to immediately arrest and surrender President Bashir was submitted by the ICC Prosecutor and a responding decision following this request was issued by Judge Tarfusser. 78 In this decision Judge Tarfusser determined that '[a]s there exists no issue which remains unclear or has not already been explicitly discussed and settled by the Court, the consultations under article 97 of the Statute between the Court and the Republic of South Africa have therefore ended'.
79
Judge Tarfusser concluded in unequivocal terms that it is plain that 'there is no ambiguity in the law and that the Republic of South Africa is under the obligation Subsequently, advocate I Ellis, who appeared for the respondents to the application presented to the Court 'that the Cabinet had taken a decision to grant President Bashir immunity from arrest, and that this decision "trumped" the Government's duty to arrest the President on South African soil in terms of two warrants of arrest issued by the ICC' and requested an adjournment to prepare a full argument. 84 Fabricius J, 'mindful of the fact that the African Union Summit, which President Bashir was attending, would be in session for the whole of that day and for the entire day on Monday', 85 until a final order is made in this application, and the Respondents are directed to take all necessary steps to prevent him from doing so'.
86
On 15 June 2015, the application continued before a Full Court consisting of Mlambo JP, Ledwaba DJP and Fabricius J. 87 Importantly, the Court specifically requested advocate Mokhari SC, appearing for the respondents, 'to provide an indication whether President Bashir was still in the country', 88 to which advocate Mokhari SC provided reassurances that President Bashir was still in South Africa, which he repeated throughout the hearing. 89 These reassurances, however, contradict media reports, for example, those made by The Guardian and The New York Times, both of which reported that President Bashir left South Africa on the morning of 15 June 2015. The New York Times reported that President Bashir's presidential jet 'left a South African military airport near Pretoria, the capital, unhindered by the South African authorities' on Monday morning, 'just hours before a South African court ruled that the government was legally required to arrest him'. 90 The Guardian was more specific, reporting that 'Bashir's plane took off from Waterkloof military airfield outside Pretoria' early on Monday.
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Around 15:00, having heard arguments the Court handed down the order that 'the conduct of the Respondents, to the extent that they have failed to take steps to arrest and/or detain the President of the Republic of Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, is inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and invalid'. 92 Furthermore, the Court ordered that 'the Respondents are forthwith compelled to take all reasonable steps to prepare to arrest President Bashir … and detain him, pending a formal request for his surrender from the International Criminal Court'. 93 The reasons for this order were explained by the Court at a hearing on 24 June 2015 and are discussed below.
It is reported in the media that immediately after the handing down of the order for President Bashir's arrest the Court was informed that the President had left South Africa. 94 In the corresponding 'Respondents' Explanatory Affidavit', 100 Mkuseli Apleni, Director General of the Department of Home Affairs, claimed to have contacted immigration officials at Waterkloof Air Force Base in response to media claims that President Bashir had departed from there. He stressed that he had been informed that the passport of President Bashir was not one of the passports that were 'handed to immigration for processing of the persons that were on board the flight (of the presidential jet SUDAN01)'. 101 Apleni went on to explain the immigration protocols and procedures involved for the departure of 'VIP flights', expounding that immigration officers were not provided with passenger lists and that 'passengers on VIP flights do not personally appear before the Immigration Officer'. 102 Apleni made clear that these procedures were adhered to 'in respect of Sudanese flight SUDAN01 on 15 June 2015', 103 before concluding that 'it would therefore appear from the above that President Bashir departed from the Republic [of South Africa] without his passport being presented to the Immigration Officer'. 104 He also emphasised that the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, in conjunction with the South African Police Service, was responsible for facilitating the itinerary and transport of a visiting dignitary. However, Apleni failed to provide an explanation of how these departments were unaware of the movement of President Bashir to the air force base. Furthermore, he did 
117 This provision only deals with the conferral of immunity to 'organisations', defined under the Immunities Act as 'an intergovernmental organisation of which two or more states or governments are members and which the Minister has recognised for the purposes of this Act'.
118 Therefore, the Immunities Act does not allow for the conferral of immunity to heads of state. It follows that the Host Agreement does not confer immunity on President Bashir either.
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The Court opined that the African Union Convention or Host Agreement could not be relied upon to confer immunity to President Bashir as they did not 'trump' South Africa's obligations under the Implementation Act or the ICC Statute.
120
The Court held that decisions of the AU are 'persuasive, at best' under South African domestic law. 121 In the Court's view, the Immunities Act 'does not domesticate the OAU Convention. It is therefore not binding in South Africa, and the structures, staff and personnel of the AU consequently do not automatically enjoy privileges and immunity in South Africa'. 122 This represents a 'clear choice'
to not confer 'blanket immunity' on representatives of member states who attend AU meetings in South Africa. 123 Citing the previously discussed DRC Decision, the Court stressed that 'the Respondents' argument based on immunities provided for in the host agreement and on AU membership is misguided '. 124 Finally, the Court observed that the question of necessity was never raised by the respondents, that is, that the respondents failed to address the question of whether 'the government of South Africa was justified in disobeying the order of 14 June 2015, or ignoring its domestic and international obligations in terms of the Implementation Act'. 125 The are exhausted. 131 In the government's view President Bashir enjoyed diplomatic immunity and it had done nothing wrong by not arresting him.
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IV HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law has traditionally provided immunity for heads of state and other government officials for their activities when subject to litigation action in foreign domestic courts. Doing so reflects both pragmatic and theoretical objectives by ensuring a measure of freedom in the conduct of international affairs and recognition of the horizontal relationship that exists between states and their respective sovereignties under international law. While this concept of immunity continues to faithfully represent current principles of international law, its durability has been tested in numerous fora. As developed in this part, while established immunities are still asserted and recognised, there is a growing correlative acceptance by the international community that sovereign immunity is not so absolute, at least where crimes under international law have been committed.
A Rationale for Sovereign Immunity
The basis for the general rule of sovereign immunity is articulated in the famous US Supreme Court decision Schooner Exchange v McFaddon, where Marshall CJ described the immunity in the following way:
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another … This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation. Under existing tenets of international law, the immunity is also available to former office holders but only in relation to government or official acts. It is a well-established substantive immunity under international law characterised as functional or organic immunity (ratione materiae) and has found consistent support from both international and domestic courts.
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This doctrine grants immunity from criminal and civil proceedings in a foreign domestic court and applies to protect the state and, only incidentally, the individual concerned from such proceedings. While attaching to official or government acts, it does not apply to actions taken privately or otherwise not consistent with official functions. A key issue under this head of immunity, therefore, is whether an act in question was undertaken in an official capacity or a personal one. If the latter, then the immunity does not apply to protect the individual from foreign court proceedings. Moreover, even if the former, it does not absolve the state from more generally attracting state responsibility for action undertaken on the plane of international law, even if the individual is not susceptible to domestic court action. 
Immunity Ratione Personae
In contrast to functional state immunity (ratione materiae) discussed above, is the parallel concept of personal sovereign immunity (ratione personae). This immunity is procedural in nature and is narrower in scope. 138 It is concerned with the personal status of the individual. Hence, it is intended to apply only to some categories of state officials, namely 'serving heads of state and heads of diplomatic missions, their families and servants', 139 as well as serving ministers of foreign affairs, and provides absolute immunity ensuring that while still in office, a head of state or head of a diplomatic mission/foreign affairs minister is not liable to be arrested or detained on any ground whatsoever.
The Relationship between Immunity Ratione Materiae and Immunity Ratione Personae
The relationship between the two immunities is close and they effectively overlap as the individual may also have functional immunity for their actions. As Cassese has observed, 'the two classes of immunity coexist and somewhat overlap as long as a state official who may also invoke personal or diplomatic immunities is in office'.
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While these two forms of immunity, the functional (ratione materiae) and the personal (ratione personae), overlap there are important distinctions. The former can be waived on the basis of an inquiry by the relevant court or tribunal into the quality of the actions undertaken. Hence as outlined above, private or nonofficial actions are not covered by the immunity. Conversely, the latter personal immunity attaches to a much narrower band of high official and does attach (as a procedural right) to any actions of the high official. This distinction was emphasised by Lord Millet in the case of Pinochet where he noted that the immunity 'is not available to serving heads of government who are not also heads of state, military commanders and those in charge of the security forces, or their subordinates. It would have been available to Hitler but not to Mussolini or Tojo'.
141 As deeply rooted as this immunity is within the fabric of relations between states, it only applies inter se between states and their national courts.
B Lifting of Functional Immunity with Respect to International Crimes in Domestic Courts
The lifting of functional immunity (ratione materiae) within domestic legal proceedings has occurred with a level of consistency in the recent past. that functional immunity could not prevent a foreign court from trying a person charged with crimes against humanity. 142 Notably, in the Eichmann case the Supreme Court defined crimes against humanity in the wider sense as including genocide and war crimes:
There is no basis for the doctrine when the matter pertains to acts prohibited by the law of nations, especially when they are international crimes of the class of 'crimes against humanity' (in the wide sense). Of such odious acts it must be said that in point of international law they are completely outside the 'sovereign' jurisdiction of the State that ordered or ratified their commission, and therefore those who participated in such acts must personally account for them and cannot shelter behind the official character of their task or mission, or behind the 'Laws' of the state by virtue of which they purported to act.
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The Court in that instance made a logical and legally sustainable conclusion that the commission of crimes against humanity as understood under international law could not be consistent with 'official duties' to sustain a plea of functional immunity. The case stands as a significant touchstone in this area of specialisation.
The finding of the Israel Supreme Court was subsequently adopted by the House of Lords in Pinochet. 144 Referring to the Eichmann judgment, Lord Millet reasoned that the commission of international crimes of universal jurisdiction deprived a state official of the protection of functional immunity. 145 In that instance the Court determined that as a former head of state, Senator Pinochet's actions in authorising acts of torture were not consistent with 'official duties' and hence did not attract immunity ratione materiae. 146 This was based on the firm, but narrow, ground that international crimes attracting universal jurisdiction cannot be consistent with official capacity. Significantly, the Court opined that this would not apply to 'ordinary' crimes of murder and conspiracy to commit murder 147 which do not have any particular international status.
Significantly, however, the House of Lords in the Pinochet case also made clear that personal immunity (ratione personae) would have protected Pinochet had he still been acting as head of state at the time of the proceedings. 148 This conclusion was supported by the ICJ in the subsequent Arrest Warrant case, where the Court surveyed existing precedent and practice from national jurisdictions and determined that:
It has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.
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The Court did make a number of additional observations regarding this conclusion, pointedly stating that immunity did not mean impunity. 150 While immunity of the ratione personae variety still existed as a bar to prosecuting a relevant serving minister of state, the Court pointed to a number of ways in which such persons even in this category might still be prosecuted for their crimes. These included the possibility that immunity could be waived by the relevant national government itself in relation to the foreign proceeding; that such persons may be prosecuted by their own states even if still serving; that upon ceasing to serve as an incumbent relevant minister of state then foreign jurisdictions may exercise prosecutorial discretion; and finally, that: This last possibility is one that has emerged with increasing frequency in the last few decades. It was discussed in Part III of this article in relation to Sudan and is also the focus of the following analysis.
C International Jurisdiction and the Question of Sovereign Immunities
As identified by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, objections to one state sitting in judgement of another state through domestic processes (par in parem non habet imperium) are avoided where the tribunal or court considering a matter is one that has an international character. Acting in this supranational capacity, the nature of such proceedings avoids the theoretical stigma of competing sovereignties and equals sitting in judgement of each other.
Since the Second World War, legal instruments establishing international courts and tribunals have generally excluded a plea of both functional and personal immunity. At customary international law, a state official cannot plead their official position as a bar to criminal liability in respect of international crimes in the nature of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression, which attract universal jurisdiction. The rule prohibiting such a plea saw its genesis in the international legal proceedings relating to criminal liability that followed the Second World War. The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings. In respect of the ICC Statute, art 27 states:
London Agreement
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
The inclusion of such a sweeping articulation of liability in an instrument intending to have broad international scope demonstrates the resolve at international law to ensure that immunity should not equal impunity. As art 27 demonstrates, the ICC is able to prosecute incumbent and former state officials for alleged commission of international crimes as (1) functional immunities cannot be pleaded with respect to international crimes of universal jurisdiction and (2) immunities, both functional and personal, are 'horizontal immunities', and cannot be pleaded before international, as opposed to domestic, courts and tribunals. the Chamber considers that the current position of Omar Al Bashir as Head of a state which is not a party to the Statute, has no effect on the Court's jurisdiction over the present case.
160
The conclusion appears to reaffirm that provisions in art 27 are representative of customary international law. While this is certainly an eminently defensible position, it does not immediately answer the question of how the ICC can generally exercise jurisdiction against the head of state of a non-party to the ICC Statute. In this instance, as discussed above in Part III, the matter was referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council and to that end while this triggering mechanism is permitted for individuals of even non-state parties, 161 the Court will need to navigate carefully what rules and substantive provisions it can apply from the ICC Statute to a defendant of a non-state party. While there is general consensus that this matter is one that should result in ICC action, the way in which it is done can have far-reaching effects to a number of general principles of international law.
B Arguments for Arrest
Pursuant to a number of instruments and principles of international law South Africa had a clear legal obligation to arrest President Bashir during his attendance of the 25 th AU Summit. These derive, inter alia, from South Africa's obligations under the ICC Statute, from South Africa's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and from South Africa's obligations under the Genocide Convention.
South Africa's Obligations under the ICC Statute
South Africa signed the ICC Statute on 17 July 1998 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 27 November 2000. 162 It follows that South Africa is clearly bound by the ICC Statute. Article 59 of the ICC Statute provides that '[a] State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws'. Article 86 imposes on all State Parties a general obligation to 'cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court'. Further, the preamble to the ICC Statute '[recalls] that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes'.
To restate, a warrant for the arrest of President Bashir was issued by the ICC on 4 March 2009 by Pre-Trial Chamber I for: the war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against civilians and pillage; and for the crimes against humanity of murder, forcible transfer, extermination, rape and torture.
163 A further warrant for the arrest of President Bashir was issued by the ICC on 12 July 2010 for the crime of genocide. Where a State Party receives a request under this Part in relation to which it identifies problems which may impede or prevent the execution of the request, that State shall consult with the Court without delay in order to resolve the matter. Such problems may include, inter alia: (a) Insufficient information to execute the request; (b) In the case of a request for surrender, the fact that despite best efforts, the person sought cannot be located or that the investigation conducted has determined that the person in the requested State is clearly not the person named in the warrant; or (c) The fact that execution of the request in its current form would require the requested State to breach a pre-existing treaty obligation undertaken with respect to another State.
'unequivocal terms' of the obligation to arrest President Bashir and surrender him to the ICC. 168 On 13 June 2015 the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued a decision following the Prosecutor's request for an order further clarifying that the Republic of South Africa is under the obligation to immediately arrest and surrender President Bashir. According to this decision:
it is unnecessary to further clarify that the Republic of South Africa is under the duty under the Rome Statute to immediately arrest Omar Al-Bashir and surrender him to the Court, as the existence of this duty is already clear and needs not be further reiterated. 169 As such there existed a clearly articulated legal basis and clear legal obligation for South Africa, as a party to the ICC, to arrest President Bashir in compliance with its obligations under the ICC Statute.
South Africa's Obligations Based on its UN Membership
Additionally, with respect to the Darfur situation it should be noted that South Africa's obligations come not only from its status as a State Party to the ICC Statute but also by virtue of its UN Membership. To recall, in the case of Darfur, the jurisdiction of the ICC was enacted through Security Council Resolution 1593, adopted on 31 March 2005. 170 Resolution 1593 was the decision of the Security Council to refer to the ICC 'the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002'.
171 As Gillett correctly observes, with this resolution '[t]he United Nations thereby accepted the ICC's jurisdiction with respect to that situation, which encompasses the arrest warrants and proceedings against Bashir for genocide'.
172 When passing this resolution, the Security Council was acting under its ch VIII powers concerning international peace and security. In terms of obligations that arise under Resolution 1593, the Security Council first explicitly made reference to the government of Sudan -a non-party to the ICC Statute -and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur. By using mandatory language in para 2 of Resolution 1593, the Security Council specified that these States 'shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor'. 175 The second part of this paragraph addresses all other states. Here, by using softer language, and 'while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute', the Security Council 'urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully'.
176 Based on this part of para 2, UN members which are also parties to the ICC Statute are under an obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC, but UN members 'and concerned regional and other international organizations' not party to the ICC Statute (except Sudan and 'all other parties to the conflict in Darfur') are not under such an obligation -they are merely being 'urged' to cooperate fully. being a non-party state, is under an obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC by virtue of its UN membership. As noted, this has been unequivocally spelt out by the first part of para 2 of Resolution 1593. Sudan's obligation to cooperate with the ICC pursuant to Resolution 1593 is similar to Serbia's obligation to cooperate with the ICTY. Even though it did not vote for the establishment of the ICTY, Serbia's membership in the UN was deemed its acceptance of the ICTY's jurisdiction.
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As far as South Africa is concerned, by being a member of the UN which is also party to the ICC Statute, South Africa is clearly in the category of states which are, pursuant to the second part of para 2 of Resolution 1593, obliged to 'cooperate fully' with the ICC. South Africa has failed to comply with the terms of Resolution 1593 in failing to arrest President Bashir. to the convention five years later, with no reservations. 186 Therefore, Sudan cannot claim that it is being subjected to a legal instrument by which it is not bound. 187 Article 1 of the Genocide Convention provides that 'Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish'. This is consistent with the ICJ's holding in the Bosnian Genocide case that all States Parties to the Genocide Convention have an obligation in relation to the punishment of those who have committed genocide. 188 Pursuant to art 4 of the Genocide Convention, '[p]ersons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals'. Therefore, no one, including heads of states, is exempt from accountability for these acts. Article 6 of the Genocide Convention makes clear that this applies to both domestic and international level. Article 6 calls for the trial of persons who are accused of acts prohibited by the Convention, namely:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 189 In the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ explicated that art 6 of the Genocide Convention obliges states to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of territorial jurisdiction or surrender the suspect to an international penal tribunal 'failing prosecution of them in the parties' own courts '. 190 This provision (of art 6) is binding on both South Africa and Sudan as States Parties to the Genocide Convention and engages their obligation. These two states have accepted jurisdiction of an 'international penal tribunal' referred to in art 6 of the Genocide Convention, which is the ICC in the instant case: the former by becoming de jure party to its Statute (ie, by ratifying the ICC Statute) and the latter by becoming 'a de facto State Party to the Rome Statute by virtue of Resolution 1593'. 191 Accordingly, both States are obligated to cooperate with this international penal tribunal. The obligation to cooperate with the international penal tribunal, as implicitly envisaged by art 6 of the Genocide Convention, 192 is clarified by the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide case: it is certain that once such a court has been established, Article VI obliges the Contracting Parties 'which shall have accepted its jurisdiction' to cooperate with it, which implies that they will arrest persons accused of genocide who are in their territory -even if the crime of which they are accused was committed outside it -and, failing prosecution of them in the parties' own courts, that they will hand them over for trial by the competent international tribunal.
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Given that the international community lacks an international police force, states have the obligation to apprehend persons charged with genocide. Thus, as the Convention itself spells it out, 'international cooperation is required '. 194 To think differently would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention, that is, the prevention and punishment of genocide. 195 In its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the ICJ noted that one of the consequences of genocide being a crime under international law 'is the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the cooperation required "in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge" '. 196 Therefore, there is a very clear obligation arising from both treaty and customary law, and the existence of evidence of the crime of genocide, to arrest President Bashir and transfer him to the ICC. This argument has previously been noted in relation to the failures of other States to arrest President Bashir in the past.
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What sets the South African situation apart, however, is the depth of the domestic judicial response to the government's failure to act upon the ICC's arrest warrants and the subsequent increase of general interest in the issue of head of state immunity echoed worldwide.
C Arguments against Arrest
A number of arguments have been made in support of the proposition that President Bashir should not have been arrested during his visit to South Africa. These arguments essentially reflect two concerns -one is legal and the other is geo-political.
Legal Arguments
The arguments against arrest of President Bashir mainly revolve around the head of state immunity and the validity of the AU position on head of state immunity. As discussed, President Bashir was in South Africa to attend the 25 th AU Summit. Arguably the South African government sought to grant immunity to all attending the Summit. 198 It was contended that the ICC requests to arrest President Bashir were preempted by the obligation to respect President Bashir's immunities as head of a member state of the AU.
However, the argument that President Bashir could be granted immunity for the commission of crimes falling within the ICC's jurisdiction is flawed. To say again, pursuant to art 27(1), the ICC Statute applies to all individuals irrespective of their official capacity and specifically includes heads of state:
This statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a head of state or government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 199 Nevertheless, basing its arguments on the 2009 AU's decision not to cooperate with the ICC, pursuant to art 98 of the ICC Statute, until the UN Security Council has considered the request by the AU for a deferral of its decision to refer the matter to the ICC, and despite the subsequent practice of the Security Council (which included the adoption of Resolution 1593), the South African government decided that it was not obliged to arrest President Bashir. Under this argument, President Bashir is shielded by art 98(1) which refers to head of state immunity, guaranteed by customary international law, which is an absolute immunity and which can only be lifted by Sudan's waiver.
According to the South African government, South Africa's refusal to arrest President Bashir is further strengthened by art 98(2) which refers to other international agreements, which is in this case again the 2009 AU decision not to cooperate with the ICC, pursuant to art 98 of the ICC Statute. However, it is difficult (impossible) to qualify this decision as a 'preexisting treaty obligation' incumbent upon South Africa. 200 The South African government has stressed that there is the tension between arts 27(2) and 98 of the ICC Statute and that the ICC needs to provide clear guidelines in order to assist States Parties with fulfilling their obligation to cooperate with the ICC vis-à-vis arrest warrants. 201 In the government's view arts 27 and 98 seem to fully contradict one another: while art 27 removes immunity of heads of state, art 98 appears to require the ICC to respect immunity when requesting state cooperation.
The question of the tension between art 27 and 98 has also caught scholarly attention. For example, Akande argues that the only way to give meaningful effect to both provisions is to interpret art 98 as requiring the ICC and national authorities to respect immunities accruing to non-parties and that art 27 is to be taken as removing immunities accruing to ICC Parties. 202 Blommestijn and Ryngaert distinguish between immunity from prosecution and immunity from arrest. The former is governed by art 27(2), which provides that '[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person'. 203 The latter is dealt with by art 98, which concerns the traditional types of immunity recognised under international law and establishes the conditions under which the ICC may proceed with a request for surrender or assistance.
However, these two scholars explain that these are different types of immunity as 'they address two completely separate stages of the ICC's proceedings'. 204 They argue that art 98(1) precludes national authorities of State Parties from acting upon the warrant under customary international law. They contend that only if President Bashir's immunity was waived, a subsequent UN Security Council resolution (to remove art 98's requirement to secure the cooperation of the third state) to be adopted, or President Bashir to be removed from office, would states be allowed to arrest and surrender President Bashir to the ICC. 205 Under this argument, the Pre-Trial Chamber, when making its request for state cooperation, acted in violation of art 98(1) and thus acted ultra vires. 206 While art 98 may appear to be causing confusion and may benefit from more clarity, it did not preclude South Africa from complying with the ICC's request to arrest President Bashir. In the DRC Decision, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II settled the same matter. It is worth recalling that Resolution 1593 adopted by the UN Security Council, acting under ch VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, had already conferred jurisdiction over the Darfur situation on the ICC and recognised that immunity of a sitting head of state does not apply in this case. 207 In its second paragraph the Resolution also asked states to cooperate with the ICC. Furthermore, all states have to comply with Security Council's decisions. UN member states' obligations under the Charter of the United Nations take precedence over obligations under any other states' agreements. 208 It follows that South Africa's decision not to arrest President Bashir was in defiance of its obligations emanating from its ICC and UN membership. In parallel, by refusing to cooperate with the ICC, South Africa was also in dissonance with its obligations under the Genocide Convention.
Geo-Political Arguments
The geo-political arguments pertain generally to the African concerns, not only with the actions of the ICC itself, 209 but with the implications for an African nation who complies with the ICC's arrest warrant in defiance of the AU position on the warrant.
The attitude of the AU towards the ICC became hostile in 2008 upon the indictment by the ICC of President Bashir. 210 The AU position is that the ICC Statute does not remove immunity granted by international law to officials of states not party to this Statute. 211 In 2009, the AU Peace and Security Council issued a Communiqué in which it 'express[ed] deep concern over the decision … to issue an arrest warrant against … Al-Bashir … at a critical juncture in the process to promote lasting peace, reconciliation and democratic governance in the Sudan. 212 The AU adopted the view that the ICC's decision 'may lead to further suffering for the people of the Sudan' 213 and criticised the UN Security Council for failing to comply with the request by the AU to apply art 16 of the ICC Statute which would have deferred the prosecution. In July 2010 the AU renewed its call for members not to arrest President Bashir pursuant to the ICC arrest warrant. 214 This AU position was also reiterated in January 2012 at the 18 th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of African Union Heads of State and Government. 215 The AU decision highlighted the need for African States to continue to push the UN Security Council to place the matter of the ICC Statute art 16 deferral provision in relation to Sudan. 216 On the events of June 2015 in letting President Bashir depart South Africa, the South African government is reported as having tweeted 'South Africa had "to balance its obligations to the ICC with its obligations to the AU and individual States". 217 African National Congress Secretary General Gwede Mantashe is also noted as having said arresting President Bashir would have led to war with Sudan.
D Consequences of the June 2015 South Africa Events
Pursuant to the ICC Statute
The key provision in respect of failures by states to comply with their obligations to the ICC is art 87(7) of the ICC Statute. Article 87(7) provides:
Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of this statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under this statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.
As it has been seen with the earlier failures of other African states to arrest President Bashir, the response of the ICC is to find the state having failed to comply with its obligations under the ICC Statute and, to refer its decision to the President of the ICC for transmission to the Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC. 219 Shortly after the AU summit in South Africa, on 24-25 June 2015, a resumed session of Assembly of States Parties 13 th session was held in The Hague. The issue of non-compliance was not discussed there but it was the supplementary agenda item (proposed by South Africa, however) for the 14 th session of the Assembly of States Parties, which was held in The Hague from 18-26 November 2015.
Because the situation in Darfur was referred to the ICC by the Security Council, the referral to the Security Council has particular significance. Article 17(3) of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations applies. 220 This means that where a state fails to cooperate with the Court, the Court shall inform the Security Council. The Security Council is to inform the Court of its action it takes in response, if any. On 26 June 2015, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber communicated to the Security Council the 10 th finding of Sudan's non-compliance in not arresting and rendering President Bashir to the Court. 221 her briefing to the Council on 29 June 2015, the ICC Prosecutor reminded the Security Council that those individuals, including President Bashir, were still wanted by the Court.
ICC but also on its own law and judiciary. 232 South Africa's withdrawal came only days after Burundi signaled its intention to leave the ICC, and was also followed by Gambia's similar announcement, accusing the ICC of the 'persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans', 233 and the argument made by some other African States that 'there's a need for the whole of Africa to withdraw from the ICC'.
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3 Globally for the ICC South Africa is now added to the list of states parties to the ICC Statute which have failed to arrest President Bashir -Malawi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Kenya and Djibouti. 235 The failure clearly has implications for the ICC. Relations between the ICC and Africa are evidently strained. This was the case long before the non-arrest by South Africa. 236 Recently the President of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC Statute, Sidiki Kaba, met with Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the AU Commission. Mr Kaba was quoted as saying 'I am convinced that there is an urgent need to restore trust between the Court and African States Parties to the Rome Statute'. 237 After the decision of the ICC in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo's failure to arrest President Bashir, Boschiero asked: 'Has the Court lost patience?' 238 It has been remarked that it would seem that it has, and that the decision of the Court considering South Africa's failure to arrest President Bashir will be an interesting read to determine if there is anything further the ICC can do in the face of the AU's position that President Bashir should not be brought to The Hague.
African states were heavily involved in bringing about the ICC and the ICC Statute is well ratified in the region. 239 African support is important for the Court. Murithi observes:
It is an understatement to note that the relationship between the African Union and the [ICC] has commenced badly. Indeed, one could not imagine a worse start. Both organizations share a convergence of mandates to address impunity and to ensure accountability for violations, atrocities and harm done in the past. The organizations diverge in that the African Union is a political organization and the International Criminal Court is an international judicial organization … On paper it would appear that the two approaches may never converge. 240 The AU has noted an intention to take the issue to the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion on the issue of head of state immunity. 241 This may well be a positive development in so far as it resolves the outstanding legal issue and paves the way for some convergence and therefore greater support by Africa for the institution going forward.
Equally, if another state had the political will, South Africa could be brought before the ICJ for its failure to cooperate with the ICC.
VI CONCLUSION
The role of both functional and personal immunities for state officials is still significant in the panoply of international law. This doctrine under international law is durable and is applicable in most domestic court proceedings where action is attempted against such officials. It is also equally clear, though, that when it comes to crimes of international law attracting universal jurisdiction the domestic courts much more cautiously assess functional immunity and have been prepared to construe more narrowly what an official act is. In the context of international tribunals and courts exercising jurisdiction over similar classes of laws, the 'horizontal' sensitivities of competing sovereignties are not applicable. Moreover, after a slow start, both treaty and customary international law in the late 20 th and early 21
st centuries are resolute in ensuring that official status is irrelevant to the exercise of jurisdiction in the context of international criminal law. Such a trend parallels the general thrust of international law and its agency in realising greater protection to human rights and to make accountable those that egregiously violate fundamental standards of international behaviour.
States have to play their crucial roles in bringing to justice those responsible for violations of such standards. However, as the ICC's experience with South Africa's refusal to arrest President Bashir demonstrates, the interference of the political nuances into the legal fora curtails efforts to end impunity for incumbent heads of state. Those nuances may create serious implications for future effectiveness of the ICC and may ultimately pose deep challenges for delivery of justice for victims of the most serious crimes, including genocide, which are of concern to the entire international community.
